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THE APPLICABILITY OF
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION, IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY, COMMONLAW FRAUD, AND THE CONSUMER FRAUD
ACT TO OMISSIONS OF MATERIAL FACTS IN A
COMMERCIAL LEASE
ROBERT

W.

GRAY'

Chicago, like most northern cities, has two seasons: winter and road
construction. Those orange barrels in the middle of the streets mean big
contracts, big taxes, and big traffic jams. If the construction surrounds a
retail property, however, they also mean big losses. Where a small retail
tenant negotiates a short-term lease and a summer-long road construction
project adjacent to the property is planned to begin shortly after
commencement of the lease, is the landlord required to disclose the project's
existence?
Buyers and sellers of commercial property in Illinois lack guidance on
what must be disclosed in their transaction, although their residential
counterparts enjoy specific statutory direction under the Residential Real
Property Disclosure Act.' Moreover, the courts are in conflict on the
availability of common-law remedies to a commercial property buyer whose
business suffers where the seller fails to disclose material facts in the
negotiations.2
In 1961, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, 3 ("Consumer Fraud Act" or "the Act"), in
an attempt to eradicate fraud in the marketplace. 4 The Act is broadly
. J.D./LL.M. Candidate, May 2006. I would like to thank my wife, Donna, for her
love, support and understanding.
1. In 1993, the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act was passed, and later
amended, to require the seller to disclose at least twenty-two different pieces of
information about the property in question. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/1-77/99 (2004). As
its name implies, the Act excludes commercial property. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/5
(defining residential real property as "real property improved with not less than one nor
more than 4 residential dwelling units").
2. See discussion infra Part I (highlighting the conflicts and problems inherent in
obtaining a remedy through actions premised on constructive eviction, implied warranty of
habitability, and common law fraud).
3. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1-505/12 (2004).
4. Robinson v. Toyota Motor Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002); Salkeld v. V.R.
Bus. Brokers, 548 N.E.2d 1151, 1160 (I11.App. Ct. 1989).
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interpreted to fill legislative gaps between more specific statutory mandates. 5
The Consumer Fraud Act may be available as a gap-filler against certain
commercial property sellers that fail to disclose a material fact.6 The
commercial real estate industry, however, deserves more than the ambiguous
gap-filling offered by the Act.
Part I of this comment will discuss the broad, underlying conflict
between caveat emptor and good faith disclosure that has developed in
commercial real estate transactions through the common law doctrines of
constructive eviction, implied warranty of habitability, and common law
fraud. This conflict is the backdrop to the enactment of the Consumer Fraud
Act, a discussion of which will bring Part I to a close. Part II will analyze
whether the Act is available to the hypothetical retail tenant or to other
commercial property buyers when the seller fails to disclose a material fact.
Finally, Part III will show that further legislation is needed, and will offer
suggestions for legislation which will allow commercial buyers and sellers to
more easily predict the legal ramifications of their actions.
I. AMIDST A BACKGROUND OF COMMON-LAW CONFLICT
BETWEEN GOOD FAITH AND CAVEAT EMPTOR, THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY PASSED THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT.

A.

HistoricalConflict: The Broader Argument Between Seller and Buyer.

Liability for failure to disclose a material fact is really a dispute
between caveat emptor7 and good faith and fair dealing.5 The argument
5. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 la. This command has been reiterated and followed
many times over by the courts. E.g., Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 675 N.E.2d 584,
594 (I11.1996); Malooley v. Alice, 621 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Eshaghi v.
Hanley-Dawson Cadillac, 574 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
6. See discussion infra Part II (analyzing whether the Act would be available to the
retail merchant induced into a commercial lease by the omission of a material fact by the
lessor).
7. The entire Latin phrase is: "Caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit quod ius
alienum emit," which translates to "[1]et the buyer beware; for he ought not act in
ignorance when he buys what another has right to." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY app. B,
1708 (8th ed. 2004).
8. John R. Scheid, Mandatory Disclosure Law: A Statute for Illinois, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 155, 162-65 (1993); Serena Kafker, Sell and Tell: The Fall and

Revival of the Role of Non-Disclosure in Sales of Used Property, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV.
57, 57-61 (1986); Frona M. Powell, The Seller's Duty to Disclose in Sales of Commercial
Property, 28 AM. Bus. L. J. 245, 245-48 (1990) [hereinafter The Seller's Duty to
Disclose]; Charles L. Armstrong, Who Pays the Pricefor Defective Home Construction?
A Note on Buecher v. Centex Homes, 53 BAYLOR L. REv. 687, 694-96 (2001); Frona M.
Powell, Mistake ofFact in the Sale of Real Property,40 DRAKE L. REv. 91, 93-94 (1990);
William D. Grand, Implied and Statutory Warranty in the Sale of Real Estate: The Demise
of Caveat Emptor, 15 REAL EST. L. J. 44, 44-46 (1986); Alan M. Weinberger, Let the

Buyer be Well Informed? - Doubting the Demise of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387,
388-90 (1996); Kathleen McNamara Tomcho, Commercial Real Estate Buyer Beware:
Sellers May Have the Right to Remain Silent, 70 S. CAL. L. REV., 1571, 1571-90 (1997);

Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring an Historical Understanding of Duties to
Disclose, Fraudand Warranties, 104 COM. L.J. 168, 168-95 (1999).
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0
9
dates back to the dawn of civilization. Ancient Sumerian, Israelite,' and
Roman 1 societies, all with legal systems that continue to influence our
own, 12 demanded full disclosure and fair dealing by their merchants.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the Roman Catholic Church controlled the
13
full disclosure.
marketplace and enforced the doctrines of good faith and
In fact, the ecclesiastic courts went so far as to forbid any market transaction
except during daylight hours, in order to allow buyers the opportunity to
fully inspect the goods.14
These societies often enforced their legal requirements of good faith
5
For
and fair dealing through harsh and humiliating consequences.'
sentence
in
a
result
could
workmanship
poor
example, in Ancient Sumeria,
of death, while under the rule of the Catholic Church, dishonest merchants

9. The Sumerians advocated strict liability for defects in workmanship, thereby
need for disclosure. CODE OF HAMMURABI, §§ 229-235 (L.W. King, trans.
1915), available at http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/hammurabi.htm (last visited July
31, 2005) [hereinafter HAMMURABI'S CODE].
10. The Israelite law of disclosure is exemplified in several Old Testament Passages:
Exodus 23:7, 9; Leviticus 19:11,36; Leviticus 25:14; Deuteronomy 23:19; Hosea 12:7;
Amos 8:5; Proverbs 16:11; Isaiah 28:6-17; 1 Kings 6:12. Gardner and Kuehl, supra note
8, at 170. See also LEO JUNG, BUSINESS ETHICS IN JEWISH LAW 56 (1987) (stating that
Judaism and the Torah stand only for righteousness, so that when two parties enter into a
transaction there may be a "satisfactory harvest for both").
11. The Romans espoused their laws in the Twelve Tablets, around 450BC. Allen N.
Sultan, Judicial Autonomy under InternationalLaw, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 585, 591-96
(1996). Marcus Tillius Cicero, one of the most influential orators of Rome, specifically
advocated full disclosure-apparently finding authority and support in the Twelve Tablets.
Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8, at 172 n.9. While such explicit authority does not appear
to be set out in what remains of the Tablets, some scholars believe Cicero may have
derived and defended his position from the passages in Table VIII, lines 21 ("If a patron
defrauds a client he shall be accursed") and 23 ("Whoever is convicted of speaking false
witness shall be flung from the Tarpeian Rock"), or Table VI, line 2 ("[F]or those flaws
that he has denied expressly, when questioned about them... vendor shall undergo a
penalty of double damages"). ALLEN CHESTER JOHNSON ET AL., ANCIENT ROMAN
STATUTES: TRANSLATION, WITH INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARY, GLOSSARY AND INDEX
(Clyde Pharr ed., University of Texas Press 1961), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/medieval/twelvetables.htm (last visited July 31, 2005). Also offering
support to Cicero's position is Table VIII, line 8a, which begins, "Whoever enchants away
crops..." and line 8b, which states in part, "nor shall one lure away another's grain....
Id. These provisions are an appropriate beginning to a rule advocating disclosure.
12. The Israelites, the Sumerians, the Roman Empire, and the Roman Catholic Church
are generally recognized as the oldest societies with legal systems. Daniel G. Ashburn,
Appealing to a HigherAuthority?: Jewish Law in American JudicialOpinions, 71 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 295, 295-98 (1994). Their foundational influence is still reflected in the
modem American system. Id.; Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8, at 170-74.
13. The Roman Catholic Church, through Thomas Aquinas, based its authority for
requiring disclosure on the books of the New Testament: John 14:6; Matthew 21:13; Mark
11:17; Luke 19:46; John 2:14, 15; Matthew 22:39; Mark 12:31; Romans 13:9; Galatians
5:14; and James 2:8. The Church heavily regulated the marketplace through the
ecclesiastical courts, demanding strict disclosure. Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8, at 172.
14. Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8, at 170 n.9.
15. Walter H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133,

abdicating the

1152-53 (1931).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:1289

were subject to public humiliation and were banned from the marketplaces.1 6
At some point lost in history, however, the pendulum of disclosure
requirements swung to the opposite end, embracing the notion of caveat
7
emptor.'
18
Caveat emptor, commonly translated as "let the buyer beware,"
imposes no duty to disclose material facts on either party to a contract or
conveyance. 19 Scholars have supported the doctrine because it recognizes

16. Hammurabi's Code imposed harsh penalties upon merchants for failing their
customers: faulty construction of a home called for death of a builder or a member of his
family; a defect in the building of a ship required the shipbuilder to make the purchaser
whole; and medical malpractice demanded that the surgeon's hand be cut off.
HAMMURABI's CODE, §§ 229-232. The Romans, likewise, would often kill a merchant
who intentionally defrauded a customer, although they would only require the merchant to
make a customer whole for an innocent misrepresentation. Hamilton, supra note 15, at
1145-47. Under the Catholic Church, merchants who deceived their customers and
violated the strict disclosure requirements were "displayed humiliatingly in the streets with
their wares, put in the stocks with their products underfoot and forbidden from selling...
[t]heir fraud... an affront to the community." Id. at 1152-53.
17. Professor Hamilton attributes the phrase caveat emptor to Fitzherbert, in his 1534
text, Boke on Husbandrie. Hamilton, supra note 15, at 1134. Professor Scheid, however,
contends that the phrase appeared far earlier as warnings upon the signs of Roman
merchants in the marketplace. Scheid, supra note 8, at 157. From its humble beginning as
advice to the Roman shopper, caveat emptor was later "easily translated into the law of
real estate in Middle Age England since agriculture was the sole purpose for land." Id. at
158. Scheid further notes all land belonged to the king and was given to his subjects. Id.
It would surely be only the rarest and most benevolent of monarchs that would not only
make a gift of his land but also guarantee that land's character and value through the laws
of his own court.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY app. B, 1708
19. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817), is one of the first American
cases accepting caveat emptor.
Laidlaw involved the buyer's nondisclosure of
information that would dramatically increase the value of tobacco. Id. at 178-79.
Specifically, the buyer learned that President Madison signed the Treaty of Ghent, thus
ending the War of 1812, and more importantly for the plaintiff, eliminating British
blockades of American exports. Id. at 182. Several hours after the contract was signed,
the seller learned of the Treaty and refused to deliver the tobacco at the contract price as
the ability to export the tobacco had driven the price up considerably. Id.
The Court ruled the buyer was under no duty to disclose the information to the seller
"where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties" and where each
party "take[s] care not to say or do anything tending to impose upon the other." Id. at 195.
Chief Justice Marshall rejected the plaintiff's reference to Cicero's argument that a
corn merchant who reaches the shores of a starving market before a line of other suppliers
cannot exact an inflated value for his corn by failing to apprise the buyers of the existence
of additional suppliers. Id. at 185.
An oft-cited English case highlighting caveat emptor's effect on the property buyer is
Sutton v. Temple, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Exch.). In Sutton, the tenant leased a
pasture to graze his animals. Id. at 1108. Soon after the animals grazed they began to die.
Upon examination, particles of old paint, which poisoned the animals, were found mixed
with the fertilizer that the lessor spread over the ground. Id. The lessee abandoned the
property and notified the lessor, who brought a claim for the rent. Id. at 1108-09. The
court denied the plaintiff's assertion that there was an implied covenant that the property
was fit for the purpose for which it was let, and held the lessee was obligated to pay rent
on the remainder of the lease. Id. at 1109-15.
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the freedom to contract, 2° transactional certainty, 21 the ability of the
purchaser to inspect the premises,22 the unwillingness of parties to reduce
their own bargaining position,23 and the incidental nature of buildings to the
primary conveyance of land.24 Regardless of the true origins of either
doctrine, the fundamentals of pure caveat emptor cannot be reconciled with
those of pure good faith and fair dealing.
B. DoctrinalConflict Between CaveatEmptor and Disclosure
Requirements Produce InconsistentResults in the Common Law.
1.

Constructive Eviction

In Illinois, the doctrine of constructive eviction, as a violation of the
long recognized implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, is one possible avenue
of relief for the wronged tenant.25 Under constructive eviction, a tenant is
relieved of lease obligations when the property becomes useless for its
intended purpose to the tenant through some act or omission by the
landlord, 6 which causes the tenant to abandon the property.27 Whether the
landlord had knowledge of the defect prior to execution of the lease is often
the determining factor for a constructive eviction claim.28 Illinois courts
have used constructive eviction to protect tenants of a boarding house
29
damaged by flooding caused by road construction; a tenant haberdasher
30
from ongoing water leaks; a commercial tenant whose business was hurt by

20. Kafker, supra note 8, at 58.
21. Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8, at 174.
22. The Seller's Duty to Disclose, supra note 8, at 254.
23. Id. at 250.
24. Scheid, supra note 8, at 158-59.
25. The covenant of quiet enjoyment, in Illinois, dates back to at least 1846. Beebe v.
Swartwout, 8 Ill. 162, 163-71 (Ill. 1846).
26. Auto. Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 172 N.E. 35, 37-38 (Ill. 1930).
27. The tenant need not abandon the property immediately upon discovery of the
defect. If the tenant does delay in vacating the property, however, the tenant must
thereafter prove the delay was reasonable. See id. at 38-39 (affirming verdict against
tenant where the tenant remained in possession from February to May but complained of
the landlord's failure to provide heat); JMB Props. Urban Co. v. Paolucci, 604 N.E.2d 967,
969-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding a five-year delay in abandonment operates as a waiver
from the potentially untenantable condition created by a neighboring tenant's noise);
Dell'Armi Builders v. Johnston, 526 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (affuming a
verdict against a tenant who stayed in possession of the premises for over two years).
28. Eskin v. Freeman, 203 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964). In Eskin, the complaint did
not allege the lessor knew of violations of city codes prior to the lease. Id. at 28. The
court noted the frequently stated rule: "There is... no implied warranty... the premises
are fit for ...the purpose of business

.. .

unless by some artifice, the lessor prevents the

lessee... from making an examination of latent defects known to the lessor... and
unknown to the lessee.. and of which knowledge would not be obtained by an ordinary
and reasonableexamination .... " Id. at 27 (quoting Sunasack v. Morie, 98 Ill. App. 505,
507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1900) (emphasis in original)).
29. White v. Walker, 31 111. 422, 425-29 (Ill. 1863).
30. Gibbons v. Hoefield, 132 N.E. 425, 428-29 (1921) (holding a lessor's failure to
repair water leaks and to put the premises in a tenantable condition for the purposes for
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a landlord who failed to provide heat and water and who obstructed the
entrance of the shop; 3' and tenants who could not occupy the property due to
excessive filth, an infestation of roaches, and a general state of disrepair.32
On the other hand, the courts have denied a tenant clothier's claim that
it was constructively evicted when the landlord significantly reduced
available parking spaces.33 Another court denied a defendant pizza parlor's
constructive eviction defense based upon the smell of varnish and the
presence of disruptive lines created by its new neighboring tenant, the Old
Country Buffet. 34 In that same case, however, the court affirmed a reduced
award for plaintiff landlord's claim for rent, reasoning that "the jury could
have concluded defendant was entitled to an offset because of damages
suffered by these inconveniences. 35
2.

Implied Warranty of Habitability

Other tenants have sought relief under the implied warranty of
habitability, which was incorporated into residential leases in Illinois in
1971.36 Nevertheless, some Illinois decisions still cling to caveat emptor and
refuse to imply a warranty of habitability into commercial leases to cover
defects in the premises.37 Unfortunately, many of these cases, which
involved insubstantial damages, have been relied on without further
elaboration or analysis. For example, in JB.Stein & Co. v. Sandberg, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District, after pausing to note the lack
of any substantial discussion of the issue in prior cases, nevertheless went on
to hold that a women's clothing store, that had lost its entire inventory due to
electrical problems allegedly caused by the landlord's acts or omissions,
could not assert a defense of constructive eviction to escape its lease.38

which they have been leased (a commercial haberdashery), constituted constructive
eviction even though the lease contained an exculpatory "as-is" clause).
31. Giddings v. Williams, 168 N.E. 514, 516 (I11.
1929).
32. Home Rentals Corp. v. Curtis, 602 N.E.2d 859, 862-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
33. See RNR Realty, Inc. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 522 N.E.2d
679, 685-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding insufficient evidence to show a causal
relationship between a lack of parking spaces provided by the lessor and reduced revenue
to the tenant).
34. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Nauss, 590 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
35. Id. at 528-29.
36. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (I11.
1972).
37. See Elizondo v. Perez, 356 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (refusing to extend
implied warranty to cover a crack in a window); Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Banks, 339
N.E.2d 283, 287-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)(holding that there is no implied warranty of
habitability in a lease of a gas station because there were no facts alleged to support the
warranty); Ing v. Levy, 326 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Il. App. Ct. 1975) (holding, without
discussion, that there was no implied warranty of habitability in commercial leases and,
therefore, the commercial tenant, a real estate broker, was not entitled to withhold rent
when water leaked into the office bathroom).
38. J.B. Stein & Co. v. Sandberg, 419 N.E.2d 652, 657-58 (Ill. App. 1982). To date,
there are no published opinions offering an extended discussion of how, if at all, the
implied warranty of habitability is read into commercial leases in Illinois.
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Conversely, other Illinois courts have imposed liability on commercial
landlords for latent defects in the property even if the parties appear to have
contractually waived such liability, often by requiring that a repairs-andmaintenance clause must explicitly state the precise defect at issue before the
landlord can escape liability. 39 Such straining of other legal doctrines to fill
in the gaps left by the court's refusal to imply warranties into commercial
leases is not rare. For example, after refusing to imply a warranty of
habitability or suitability for a specific purpose, one court held the landlord
liable for property damage under a theory of simple negligence in failing to
properly disconnect water pipes that damaged the defendant's drain, even
4°
though the court admitted that the landlord had no duty to disconnect them.
3.

Common Law Fraud

4
Still other tenants seek relief through an action in common law fraud. '
Fraud has been advanced under different theories of recovery, depending on
the facts of the case.42 Common law fraud in the inducement of a contract,
premised upon the omission of a material fact, requires the existence of a
duty to speak.43 That duty can be pled as a matter of law or through the
44
particular facts and circumstances of the case.

39. See Sandelman v. Buckeye Realty, Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1038, 1040-41 (I11.App. Ct.
1991) (holding a landlord liable for the replacement of a roof even though the lease
required the tenant to keep the buildings "in good repair" and the roof had not been in need
of repair for the first forty years of a seventy-year lease); Kaufinann v. Shoe Corp. of Am.,
164 N.E.2d 617, 621-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960) (holding a commercial landlord liable for
removal of a steam-heat system and installation of new system when the local utility
company discontinued service to the surrounding area, even though the lease stated that
the tenant was responsible for keeping all buildings in a "rentable condition").
40. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Kaufman Grain Co., 596 N.E.2d 1156, 1161-62 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992).
41. "[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation (sometimes
referred to as "fraud and deceit" or "deceit") are: (1) false statement of material fact (2)
known or believed to be false by the party making it; (3) intent to induce the other party to
act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statement; and (5) damage
to the other party resulting from such reliance." Soules v. Gen. Motors Corp. 402 N.E.2d
599, 601 (Ill. 1980).
42. Illinois recognizes active misrepresentation (also called deceit or fraud, where the
party commits an affirmative act or statement with knowledge of its falsity), active
concealment (where a party does more than simply remain silent, such as painting over
flood marks on a wall), half-truth misrepresentation (where a party is not totally silent,
there is an obligation to speak the whole truth), and breach of fiduciary duty for failure to
disclose a material fact (where the law requires full disclosure of facts known by one who
occupies a position of trust to the buyer). MICHAEL J. POLELLE & BRUCE L. OTTLEY,
ILL1NOIS TORT LAW §§ 9-1 - 9-11 (2004).
43. Connick, 675 N.E.2d at 593.
44. See Kinzer ex rel. City of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 539 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (I11.
1989) (holding that questions of breach of fiduciary duty are "controlled by the substantive
laws of agency, contract and equity") (internal citations omitted); Paskas v. Illini Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 440 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (recognizing attorney-client and
trustee-beneficiary relationships as fiduciary in nature as a matter of law, but rejecting
bank-depositor as such a relationship); Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, 510 N.E.2d
409, 413-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that because real-estate brokers occupy a
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In Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Christopher, two
individuals negotiated a land lease to build and operate a tavern.45 The
landlord, represented by counsel at all times, encouraged the tenants to invest
more money on improvements to the property than originally planned.46
Prior to and concurrent with the lease negotiations, however, the landlord
was also negotiating with the Forest Preserve District over an eminent
domain action to convert the same property to Forest Preserve. 47 In
condemning the landlord's silence, the court stated, "when... the other
remains silent when it is within his power to prevent expenditure under a
delusion.., to permit one to take advantage of the mistake of another would
be revolting to every sentiment of justice. ' 48 The court further stated, "there
are times ... when it becomes the duty of a person to speak, in order that the
party he is dealing with may be placed on equal footing and when a failure to
state a fact is equivalent to a fraudulent concealment ... [and amounts to an]
affirmative falsehood. 'A9
Christopher was followed by City of Chicago v. American National
Bank,50 which involved multiple commercial tenants claiming fraud in the
inducement of their lease of Chicago's McCarthy Building based on the
landlord's failure to inform them of the possibility that the building might
lose its landmark status and be condemned.5 As part of a neighborhood
redevelopment project, the city stripped the property of its landmark status
and condemned the property by ordinance. 52 Litigation to block the
ordinance was ongoing at the time of the5 negotiation
of the leases and was
3
later settled by the Illinois Supreme Court.
According to the complaint, the landlord failed to inform the tenants of
the ordinance and condemnation litigation and to some plaintiffs
affirmatively denied any possibility of losing the landmark status. 4 The trial
court dismissed the complaint finding there was no duty to disclose
condemnation proceedings because they were a matter of public record and it
was a future fact about which the landlord could not be certain until after the
position of trust, they must deal honestly and in good faith with potential buyers). But see
Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich, 487 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding
that a party asserting the existence of a fiduciary relationship that does not exist as a matter
of law, must plead, by clear and convincing evidence, the circumstantial factors that give
rise to such a relationship-factors such as "the degree of kinship, disparity of age, health,
mental condition, education and business experience between the parties, and the extent to

which the allegedly servient party entrusted the handling of his business and financial
affairs to the other and reposed faith and confidence in him").

45.
1943).
46.
47.
48.
49.

Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County v. Christopher, 52 N.E.2d 313, 314 (Ill. App. Ct.

Id. at 314-16.
Id.
Id. at316.
Id. at 319.

50. City of Chicagov. Am. Nat'lBank, 599 N.E.2d 1126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).

51. Id. at 1127-28.
52. Id.
53. Landmark Pres. Council v. City of Chicago, 531 N.E.2d 9 (111. 1988).
54. Am. Nat'l Bank, 599 N.E.2d at 1128-29.
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litigation. 55 In so doing, the trial court reasoned, "a person in possession of
faculties is not justified in relying upon representations before he
his mental
,, 56
acts.

Justice McCormick rebuked the trial court's ruling, holding that such
reasoning, "which is a restatement of the principle of caveat emptor, is not
the law in Illinois. 57 On appeal, the tenants' claims for apportionment of
the condemnation award was allowed because the landlord fraudulently
induced the leases.5 s
Though courts allow claims for common law fraud, they have ingrained
59
For
robust obstacles against the plaintiff in advancing such actions.
pleading
pleadings are subject to a stricter, more specific
example, fraud
requirement. 6° ~ The burden of persuasion in a common law fraud claim 66

61
is greater than most civil actions.
clear and convincing evidence Further, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to claim reliance on a deceptive
62
For
statement of the law because everyone is presumed to know the law.
party's
another
on
to
rely
example, courts differ on whether it is reasonable
statement of the law.63 This discontinuity in common law fraud, like that

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.at 1129.
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id.

59. Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8, at 173.
60. "A successful common law fraud complaint must allege, with specificity and
particularity, facts ... including what misrepresentations were made, when they were
made, who made the misrepresentations and to whom they were made." Connick, 675
N.E.2d at 591.
61. Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 446 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ill. 1983).
62. Compare Tan v. Boyke, 508 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (affirming a
verdict against defendant on a deceit claim based upon the defendant's failure to disclose
that the subject apartment building violated city zoning ordinances), and Am. Nat'l Bank,
599 N.E.2d at 1128 (holding that the plainitiff sufficiently pled fraud even though the
alleged material fact omitted was a city ordinance stripping the subject property of
landmark status and condemning building, which passed only after wide debate in the
newspapers and public litigation and appeals to the Illinois Supreme Court), and
Cappicioni v. Brennnan of Naperville, 791 N.E.2d 553, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding a
plaintiff may reasonably rely on a false statement that a home is located in a favored
school district, even though the district map is readily available to public inspection), with
Randels v. Best Real Estate, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 984, 997 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding the
plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded fraud where the vendor failed to disclose a city
ordinance that required the building be renovated for hook-ups to the city sewer system
within five years because the ordinance was public knowledge). The plaintiff knew of the
existence of both sewer and septic services in the area, and plaintiff, himself a real estate
agent, did not exercise ordinary prudence in determining the existence of such a
requirement. Id.
63. Compare Schmidt v. Landsfield, 169 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ill. 1960) (noting that it is
well settled "that a party is not justified in relying on representations made when he has
ample opportunity to ascertain the truth of the representations before he acts[;]if he does
not avail himself of the means of knowledge open to him he cannot... say he was
deceived by misrepresentations .... ), with Eisenberg v. Goldstein, 195 N.E.2d 184, 186
(Ill. 1964) (stating that "[i]f one party makes a positive statement of material fact...
which he knows to be false but intends to be relied upon by the other party as true. . . ,the
party making the statement cannot charge the other with negligence in believing it"). See
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found in constructive eviction and the implied warranty of habitability, leads
to further unpredictability in the commercial property transaction.
C. The Consumer FraudAct as a Legislative Response to Caveat Emptor.
Against this background of conflict between disclosure and caveat
emptor, the General Assembly passed the Consumer Fraud Act, "to protect
consumers and.., businessmen against fraud.., and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. ' 64
The Act's plain language requires a broad and liberal interpretation in
order to effectuate its purpose. 65 Though amendments to the Act specifically
enumerate many forms of deceptive practice,66 the potency of the Act is
found in the broad and unmistakable language of section two, which outlaws
"deception fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the
concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact ....
,67 In clear
and unambiguous language, the Act rings the death bell for merchants'
reliance on caveat emptor in Illinois.65
The courts have not only heard the call, they have been the horse that
draws the wagon. 69 The Act requires a lower burden of persuasion preponderance - as compared to common law fraud. 70 The elements of a
also Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 454 N.E.2d 723, 728-30
(I11.
App. Ct. 1983) (discussing at length the two differing opinions on the subject: the
"older approach" typifying the caveat emptor attitude and "'[t]he better reasoned cases',
[which] reject the notion that plaintiff s negligence in failing to discover intentional fraud
will bar his action for deceit" (quoting PROSSER ON TORTS § 108 (4th ed. 1971));
Cappicioni, 791 N.E.2d at 558 (holding the plaintiff did not state a claim of common law
fraud because he failed to adequately allege scienter on part of defendant in making
erroneous statement concerning the location of a house in relation to school districting,
which was public knowledge, but nevertheless holding the plaintiff had stated a claim
under the Consumer Fraud Act).
64. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1.

65. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 la. This command has been reiterated many times by
the courts. E.g., Malooley, 621 N.E.2d at 268; Eshaghi v. Hanley-Dawson Cadillac, 574
N.E.2d at 764.
66. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2A-2QQ.
67. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2.

68. The Act defines "consumer" as "any person who purchases... merchandise not
for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use ....
" 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/1(e). Implicit in the definition is the notion that corporations,
partnerships, and sole proprietorships may be considered "consumers" for the purposes of
the Act. Law Offices of William J. Stogsdill v. Cragi Fed. Bank for Sav., 645 N.E.2d 564,
566-67 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995). It appears that the General Assembly's views are in
accordance with an economist's definition of "consumer". By the same token, the courts
have noted that a private individual who is not in the business of selling the product
exchanged in the underlying transaction cannot be liable as a merchant under the Act.
Carrera v. Smith, 713 N.E.2d 1282, 1284-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding the purely
private sale of one's own home is beyond the reach of the Act).
69. The legislature did not pass section 505/10a of the Act, authorizing a private
action, until 1971-nearly one year after the Illinois Supreme Court recognized such a
private right under the Act. Rice v. Snarlin, 266 N.E.2d 183, 188 (11. 1970).
70. See Malooley, 621 N.E.2d at 268-69 (holding preponderance of the evidence to be
the correct standard as opposed to the clear and convincing evidence standard). Accord
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cause of action under the Act71 are easier to prove than those of common law
fraud,72 which so clearly protects the seller and the doctrine of caveat
emptor.73 The Act does not require the seller to have actual knowledge of
74
the falsity of the fact, so even innocent misrepresentations are actionable.
The Act does not require reasonable reliance.75 And, finally, the Act allows
the shifting of attorney's fees, awarding
of punitive damages, rescission, and
76
potentially other equitable relief.
Under the broad umbrella of the Act, th, court has provided shelter for
home purchasers,77 commercial property purchasers,78 residential tenants,79
borrowers, 80 and customers in a multitude of other industries that would have
otherwise required extensive legislative and executive investigation at the
State's expense. However, the Act is not without its bounds. The common
law pleading requirements of particularity still survive. 8' The Act requires a
showing of proximate cause, which should be analyzed under the federal
standards of transaction and loss causation.82 In addition, in a private action,
83
the deceptive act must have reached the plaintiff in order to recover.
Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot claim injury based on an overall increase in
the market price of a commodity (otherwise known as the "market theory" of
damages) due to the deceptive act.8" The Act was not intended to affect
every alleged breach of contract 85 and can be preempted when a more

Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1262 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001);
Cuculich v. Thomson Consumer Electronics, 739 N.E.2d 934, 940 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
71. The elements of a claim under the Act are: (1) a deceptive act by the defendant, (2)
intended to be relied upon by plaintiff, (3) which occurs during the course of trade or
commerce, (4) actual damage, (5) proximately caused by the deception. Zekman v. Direct
Am. Marketers, 695 N.E.2d 853, 860 (Ill. 1998).
72. Seigel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., Inc., 607 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1992); Miller v.
William Chevrolet/GEO, Inc., 762 N.E.2d 1, 11-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
73. Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8, at 169.
74. Check v. Clifford Chrysler-Plymouth of Buffalo Grove, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 829, 839
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
75. Connick, 675 N.E.2d at 593. But see discussion infra Part II (showing that the
issue of reliance is far from settled in Illinois).
76. Gent v. Collinsville Volkswagon, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 1385, 1390-91 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983).
77. Beard v. Gress, 413 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
78. Tan, 508 N.E.2d at 396-97.
79. Carter v. Mueller, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1341-42 (Il. App. Ct. 1983).
80. Walker v. Gateway Fin. Corp., 286 F.Supp.2d 965, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
81. Paul H. Schwendener, Inc. v. Larrabee Commons Partners, 787 N.E.2d 192, 201
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003). But see Zinser v. Rose, 614 N.E.2d 1259, 1263-64 (111. App. Ct.
1993) (holding the Consumer Fraud claim is not subject to the heightened specificity of a
common law fraud claim).
82. Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 157 (Ill. 2002). See also discussion
infra Part II (showing the relationship between reliance and proximate cause).
83. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160-64.
84. Id. See also Zekman 695 N.E.2d at 862 (holding the plaintiff's claim fails as a
matter of law because the plaintiff was not actually deceived).
85. Law Offices of William J. Stogsdill, 645 N.E.2d at 567.
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specific federal or state law governs the facts.86 More importantly, there is
no right to a jury under the Act 87 and the legislature explicitly allows "the
court, in 88its discretion... [to award] any other relief which the court deems
proper.,
In summary, there exists great inconsistencies in the common law due
' 89
to the conflict between caveat emptor and "an emerging duty to speak."
This Part introduced the General Assembly's response to caveat emptor in
the Consumer Fraud Act. Though the issue has never been litigated, the
Consumer Fraud Act may be another potential remedy for the commercial
property buyer where the seller performs a deceptive act that causes a loss.
II.

THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT MAY PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE AVENUE
OF RELIEF FOR AN ILLINOIS RETAIL TENANT NOT INFORMED
OF A PENDING ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECT.

Under established Illinois standards, the retail tenant on orange barrel
island should, under some circumstances, find relief under the Act. The
language of the Act calls for application to commercial real property
transactions between merchant and consumer. 90 The pending construction
project may be a "material fact" that proximately causes a commercial
tenant's injury, and the fact that such construction plans could potentially be
discovered by a thorough search of the public records should not bar the
claim. There are no other, more specific statutes preempting application of
the Act to commercial tenants. Lastly, by recognizing the claim, Illinois
would join other jurisdictions that provide commercial tenants relief.
A. The Commercial Tenant Seeking Relief Under the Act is Simply a
Logical Extension of the Well-Reasoned Decisions that Interpret the Plain
Languageof the Act to Hold MerchantPropertySellers Accountable to the
Purchaserfor Nondisclosureof a MaterialFact.
The language of the Illinois Act applies to most commercial landlords
91
and tenants. The Act authorizes "any person" to bring an action.
According to the Act, "person" includes "partnership, corporation....
company,.. .business entity or association., 92 In contrast, similar statutes
86. See Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank, 713 N.E.2d 543, 550 (Ill. 1999) (holding
Consumer Fraud claim preempted by RESPA); Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 101-02
(Ill. 1998) (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff's Consumer Fraud claim against his attorney
for alleged over-billing because the "actual practice of law" is heavily regulated by the
court superseding the CFA).
87. Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
88. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10(a).
89. Polelle & Ottley, supra note 41, at §9.01(b).
90. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. See also People ex rel. Scott v. Larance, 434 N.E.2d
5, 7-8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (noting that neither sections 505/1 nor 505/2 limit the
application of the Consumer Fraud Act to only traditional "merchants").
91. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10(a).
92. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1(c). This is the result of a change in 1981, years after
the court already interpreted the Act to include transactions between business entities, so
long as the "consumer" is not in the business of reselling the product or service that makes
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enacted in Ohio,93 Maryland,94 and Hawaii 95 are more narrowly drafted to
exclude business plaintiffs. Massachusetts divided its statute so that
individuals file claims under one section,96 while businesses (i.e., those
engaged in "the conduct of any trade or commerce") must file claims under a
separate section.97 Illinois courts have consistently found business plaintiffs
have standing under the Act so long as they purchase goods or services as the
ultimate consumer. 98 Therefore, if the orange-barrel tenant does not enter the
lease in order to sublease, the Act should not bar their claim.
Also, the Illinois Act includes real property in its definition of covered
trades and commerce. 99
Other states specifically exempt real estate
transactions from coverage under their version of the Act. 1° ° Meanwhile,
several states allow a claim for residential purchasers, but exempt
commercial property purchasers. 10 1 Illinois is one of the small number of

up the transaction for the claim. Law Offices of William J. Stogsdill, 645 N.E.2d at 56667.
93. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01(A), §1345.02(A) (West 2004) (restricting
claims to "suppliers" in a "consumer transaction").
94. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 13-101(c),(d) (2004) (restricting claims to

"purchasers of consumer goods, consumer services, consumer realty or consumer
credit... which are primarily for personal, household, family or agricultural purposes").
95. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-2 (2003) (restricting claims for unfair or deceptive
acts to consumers, the attorney general, and the director of the office of consumer
protection, but allowing any person to bring a claim for unfair competition).
96. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2004).
97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11.
98. See Law Offices of William J. Stogsdill, 645 N.E.2d at 547 (holding a law firm had
standing against a bank because it used the bank's service as a normal consumer); W.E.
O'Neil Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 984, 989 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(finding the plaintiff, a construction company, had standing to sue its insurance company
for failure to settle because the construction company used the insurance as a normal
consumer would). But see Allcare, Inc. v. Bork, 531 N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (I1l. App. Ct.
1988) (holding that a business plaintiff does not have standing to bring a Consumer Fraud
claim against a competitor in its field).
99. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1(f). See also Cappicioni,791 N.E.2d at 559 (holding
that the real-estate broker's exemption of 505/10b applies only when a real-estate
professional's misstatements are "innocent", i.e., when the client selling the property, but
not the agent, has knowledge of relevant defects).
100. See Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 273 (Mo. 1988) (interpreting
Missouri's consumer protection statute as not applicable to real estate transactions);
Heritage Hills Ltd. v. Deacon, 551 N.E.2d 125, 127-28 (Ohio 1990) (interpreting the Ohio
Consumer Fraud Act as not applicable to leases or other real estate transactions because
the statute's language explicitly excludes real estate and because such a claim would be
preempted by other, more specific statutes); Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore, 601 P.2d
1100, 1104 (Kan. 1979) (holding the Kansas Landlord Tenant Act is a more specific
regulation covering the leases of real property and, therefore, exempting coverage by the
Kansas Consumer Fraud Act).
101. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2(a) (West 2004) (requiring the purchase to be
"primarily for personal, family or household purposes"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.902
(2004) (requiring the purchase of property, including real property, to be "primarily for
personal, family or household purposes").
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to apply the Act under the broadest terms,
states compelling their 0 courts
2
including real property.1
This is exactly what Illinois courts continue to do. It is now axiomatic
that a homebuyer can seek relief from a developer. 10 3 Purchasers of
unimproved vacant property can bring a claim under the Act.' ° 4 Residential
tenants claims have long been recognized.10 5 Mobile home park leases are
also covered.10 6 Further, though it may have erred for reasons not argued on
appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District reversed a
dismissal of a consumer's claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract to
purchase two apartment buildings.10 7 As the legislature has failed to amend
the Act while the courts have continually interpreted the Act to include
property purchasers, it is reasonable to say that this interpretation is in
accordance with the legislature's will.10 8 The commercial tenant seeking
relief under the Act is simply a logical extension of the well-reasoned
decisions that hold merchant property sellers accountable to their purchaser
for nondisclosure of a material fact.

102. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 (2004). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105(1)(e),
(g), (i) & (1) (2004) (encompassing deception in the sale, lease, or advertising of real
property as a violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 751.1(b) (2004) (defining "commerce" to include all business activity except that of a
"learned" profession); TEX. Bus & COM. CODE § 17.45(4), (5)&(6) (2004) (including real
property, but excluding business consumers with more than twenty-five million dollars in
assets and requiring an analysis of the consumer's contract experience and bargaining
power to determine if the transaction was "unconscionable" for taking advantage of the
consumer to a "grossly unfair degree").
103. See Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 607 N.E.2d 194, 201 (Ill. 1992) (allowing a
claim for omission of material fact in the sale of a condominium for $1.6 million because
architectural drawings were not clear to show the existence of mullions (pillars) blocking
view of Chicago skyline); Kleczek v. Jorgensen, 767 N.E.2d 913, 920-21 (I11.App. Ct.
2002) (allowing relief for a homeowner where the builder-vendor disclosed no plumbing
code violations despite having received verbal notice of violations prior to making such a
statement).
104. See Overton v. Kingsbrooke Dev. Inc., 788 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(allowing a claim where the developer misrepresented the presence and amount of landfill
on the site, requiring additional expenditures to make the site suitable for construction).
105. See Carter,457 N.E.2d at 1341-42 (allowing a claim for a failure to provide an
apartment with a southerly view and a failure to provide an apartment with working
appliances and in clean condition).
106. See People ex rel. Fahner v. Tesla, 445 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(holding former tenants of a mobile home park had a valid claim against the defendant lotowner who refused to offer a lease to prospective purchasers of their mobile home and
instead offered to buy the homes at half the price). But see Brown v. Veile, 555 N.E.2d
1227, 1231 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that lot-owners, as resellers of used mobile
homes, do not have standing as they are not the ultimate consumers of the goods).
107. Tan, 508 N.E.2d at 396. The court might have erred in not dismissing the
plaintiff's claim in Tan due to the fact that the purchaser of an apartment building is not
the ultimate consumer of the product. Rather, the product (i.e., the living space) is bought
with the intention of reselling it to tenants. However, the issue before the court was
whether or not the buyer acted reasonably in ascertaining whether the apartments were
built without city approval. Id.
108. Modem Dairy Co. v. Dep't of Rev., 108 N.E.2d 8, 14 (I11.1952).
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B. A PendingRoad ConstructionProject Could be a MaterialFact That
Proximately Causes Damage to a Retail Tenant,for Which the
Public Availability of the Information Should not Bar Relief
1.

The roadconstructionproject could be a materialfact.

Material facts are deal breakers, ones that would cause a party to act
differently or upon which a reasonable person would normally rely in
making a decision to purchase property. 10 9 Under the Act, a seller must
disclose material facts, regardless of whether a duty to do so exists at
common law.' 10
In single-family home sales, the following examples have been held 1to
12
be material facts: defective siding;1" location in a desirable school district; 14
13
the necessity of installing sewer hook-ups; obstructed views of scenery;'
and the presence of termites. 5 Further, providing a property with a litany of
problems when the buyer requests a "maintenance free" property is an
omission of a material fact." 16 In lease arrangements, the lack of a promised
southerly view and filthy conditions in an apartment," 17 and an improper
refusal to sublease, 18 have also been held to be actionable material facts.
While no Illinois court appears to have directly addressed the issue,
courts in other jurisdictions have expanded the scope of material facts to
include off-site conditions that affect the value of the land. New Jersey
courts applied their act to a residential seller's failure to disclose an
abandoned hazardous waste site nearby and plans of a tennis court that

109. Connick, 675 N.E.2d at 595.
110. Id.
at 595.
111. Shannon v. Boise Cascade, 805 N.E.2d 213, 218-19 (Ill. 2004) (finding that
defective siding might be a "material fact" under the Deceptive Practices Act, but
nevertheless holding the plaintiff, homeowner, was not entitled to relief because she did
not see the deceptive advertising, did not allege the contractor or architect had been
deceived, and did not name the contractor or architect as defendants).
112. Cappacioni,791 N.E.2d at 560-61.
113. Randels, 612 N.E.2d at 987-88 (holding the defendant was not liable for failing to
disclose the subject building soon needed to be refitted for sewer access because the
purchaser could have discovered this fact through the exercise of due diligence).
114. Seigel, 607 N.E.2d at 199.
115. Warren v. LeMay, 491 N.E.2d 464, 470-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding the
omission of the second page of a termite report, which indicated a material infestation, was
a material fact upon which liability could be based, especially where the first page of the
report indicated there was no infestation).
116. See Malooley, 621 N.E.2d at 267-69 (listing factual circumstances supporting the
defendants' counterclaim under the Act: a broken soil pipe, an electrical system in need of
replacement, a hot water heater in need of replacement, bathroom walls that were
collapsing, a roof that leaked in the sunroom, family room, stairwell, and chimney; leakage
through the foundation into the basement, roof shingles blowing off, a stairwell wall
collapsing, and an entire ductwork system for the heating and air-conditioning system in
need of replacement-all of which problems the counter-defendant failed to disclose).
117. Carter,457N.E.2dat 1338.
118. Ex rel. Fahner,445 N.E.2d at 1252-53.
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obstructed the plaintiffs view. 9 In California, residential sellers are
required to disclose problems with neighbors, such as excessive late-night
noise.' 20 In Michigan, a court dismissed a commercial plaintiffs claim
based on the seller's failure to disclose a state highway bypass that rerouted
traffic away from the commercial enterprise.' 2' While the court agreed with
the plaintiff about the materiality of the bypass and the change in traffic
flow, it denied the claim because the plaintiff relied on their own accountant
to investigate traffic flow, not the seller's statements, and the final approval
of the bypass did not take place until ten months after the sale of the
premises. 122
Many different factors can affect the value of commercial property
enough to constitute potential material facts. 123 In an eminent domain
context, the Illinois Constitution protects access to a roadway as a right, the
public use of which cannot be taken or damaged without just
compensation.' 24 For commercial property, roadway access, entrances and
to major highways and thoroughfares are of
exits, and location in relation
25
even greater importance'
Several factors will determine whether the pending road construction
project is a material fact. If the lease is short-term - as many modem
commercial leases are - and the length of the project is extended, it would
logically be more material. 12 6 If, however, it is a long-term lease, a six-

119. See Strawn v. Caruso, 657 A.2d 420, 428-31 (N.J. 1995) (holding a developer
liable for failure to disclose the presence of an abandoned hazardous waste site nearby);
Tobin v. Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574, 577-78 (N.J. 1975) (finding for the homebuyer where the developer failed to disclose plans to build a tennis court on adjacent
property, which would obstruct the plaintiff's view and cause disruptions contrary to the
quiet community promoted by the developer). But see Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assoc.,
772 A.2d 368, 376-77 (N.J. 2001) (holding the enactment of New Jersey's disclosure
statute precluded future claims for consumer fraud so long as the seller complies with the
requirements of the new statute).
120. Shapiro v. Sutherland, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding the seller
liable for failure to disclose the neighbors played loud music late at night, poured oil on
their rooftop, and played late-night basketball games).
121. McMullen v. Jordesma, 435 N.W.2d 428, 430-31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
122. Id.
123. Letter from Jack Macke, real estate broker with Coldwell Banker, to Robert Gray
(Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with author).
124. See Dep't of Pub. Works & Bldg's v. Wilson & Co., 340 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. 1975)
(interpreting Article Two, Section Thirteen of the Illinois Constitution to require the state
to compensate property owners for a taking of access to roadways adjacent to the
property). After citing nine cases dating back to 1886, all in support of its constitutional
interpretation, the court stated, "it is clear from the foregoing cases and others that a
property owner suffers compensable damage if his access to an abutting street is
eliminated." Id.
125. Id. See also Dep't of Transp. v. Western Nat'l Bank, 347 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Ill.
1976) (finding factors such as proximity to intersections of major highways, proximity to
large shopping malls, and recent area growth are properly considered when valuing
commercial property).
126. See Charles L. Armstrong, supra note 8, at 698-99 (listing the generally shortened
term of leases as among the several factors that distinguish modem commercial leases
from their pre-industrial counterparts).
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month construction project is not only less material, but also more reasonable
for the tenant to expect and desire. Another possible factor is the timing of
the construction in relation to the commencement of the lease. If the project
starts shortly after the lease, it would seem more material, as this would
interrupt business in the beginning (and more fragile) stages of the business'
life. 127 Conversely, a project that commences long after the inception of the
lease should be less material because the business had an opportunity to
build a customer base. Another factor is the property's location. A retail
location in the middle of Chicago's Loop is less likely to be affected by road
construction, because most patrons probably walk there anyway. However, a
suburban location that relies on high vehicle traffic flow and ease of access
to and from the site by car should increase road construction's materiality.
2. A road constructionproject could cause reducedtrafficflow arounda
retailtenant,proximately causing damage.
The Act requires a private individual to prove "actual damage as a
The Illinois Supreme Court has
result of a violation of this Act .... ,,
concluded that a traditional tort analysis of proximate cause is appropriate
under the Act. 129 Proximate causation, according to the court, is analyzed as
the federal courts have applied the concepts of "transaction causation" and
"loss causation."' 30 Illinois follows the majority of federal courts in
31
requiring both transaction causation and loss causation for recovery in tort.'
Transaction causation questions whether the plaintiff would have made
the purchase or transaction if they had known of the material fact.' 32 In this
way, transaction causation is much like the common law fraud element of
actual reliance. Loss causation, on the other hand, means the damage must
flow as a natural consequence of the deceptive act. 33 Illinois courts reject
the notion that proof of transaction causation eliminates the need for loss
causation, opening damages to any foreseeable consequences of the

127. See Don B. Bradely III & Chris Cowdery, Small Business: Causes of Bankruptcy,
ASSOC. FOR SMALL Bus. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 205, 205-07

(2004), available at

http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/asbe/2004-fall/16.pdf (last visited July 31, 2005)
(discussing the fact up to seventy or eighty percent of small businesses fail within the first
year, and that such failure is, in part, due to poor choice of location).
128. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/lOa(a).
129. Zekman, 695 N.E.2d at 860-61; Martin, 643 N.E.2d at 747.
130. Martin, 643 N.E.2d at 747-50.
131. Id. at 747.
132. Zekman, 695 N.E.2d at 868 (holding a plaintiff cannot claim the defendant's
deceptions caused him harm when he knew the truth at the time he allegedly acted in
reliance on the deception).
133. Martin, 643 N.E.2d at 749 (holding that an investor who proves the transaction
caused him harm is entitled to a return of the entire investment, but where the deceit only
involves the amount that should have been paid, the investor is entitled only to the
difference between the actual amount paid and either the fair market value or what they
would have been required to pay without the deception).

The John MarshallLaw Revi'ew

[38:1289

transaction' 34 While the Illinois Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the
requirement of causation,35the case law is riddled with uncertainty, especially
with respect to reliance.
While loss causation is a fact-sensitive inquiry, the orange barrel tenant
should, as a general rule, satisfy transaction causation. The small business
retail tenant, contracting for a short-term lease, is not likely to enter the lease
if the tenant knows the outlet for its products will be strangled by a sea of
construction for a significant portion of the lease. The tenant should likewise
be able to show that large traffic jams and road construction stifle new
customers from visiting the location. Further, the construction project may
physically block the view of the store, thus reducing the advertising
effectiveness of any signs. Additionally, since less people are willing to
travel the congested routes, less potential customers will be exposed to the
tenant's advertisement. Finally, even those customers that will brave the
aggravation of road construction may do so on a less frequent basis, reducing
potential revenue.
3. The availabilityof information through public records should not bar
the tenant's claim.
When information is available to a party, the court generally holds
them accountable for that information. While reasonable reliance and a duty
to disclose are supposedly not required under the Act, many courts still
analyze the issue in those terms. Such analysis is most likely when the
deceptive act involves facts available, at least to some degree, to the public.
If the court engages in an analysis of publicly available information, it
does so because of its familiarity with the reasonable reliance element of
common law fraud, not because such analysis is required under the Act. At
common law, the operative question is whether, "there were facts and
circumstances present at the time the false representations were made
sufficient to put the injured party upon his guard or to cast suspicion upon
their truth." If there were, a party who has "neglected to avail himself
of the
'1 36
warning thus given,. . . will not afterwards be heard to complain."
Under the Act, the only reliance analysis should be (1) whether the
defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on the deceptive act or practice, (2)
whether the plaintiff actually relied on the deception to make the transaction,
37
and (3) whether that reliance proximately caused the plaintiffs damage. 1
Even under the heightened requirements of common law fraud, the fact
that information is publicly available does not necessarily bar a claim.
Illinois plaintiffs have often recovered even though they failed to ascertain

134. Id. at 750.
135. Compare id. at 754 (stating that "the Consumer Fraud Act does not require actual
reliance"), with Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160 (stating "to properly plead the element of
proximate causation in a private cause of action... under the Act, a plaintiff must allege
that he was, in some manner, deceived.")
136. Morel v. Masalski, 164 N.E. 205, 207 (I11.
1928).
137. Perona v. Volkswagen of Am., 684 N.E.2d 859, 864 (I11.
App. Ct. 1997) (citing
Connick, 174 I11.
2d at 501).
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38
whether a home was in a coveted school district; failed to note or attend
multiple city council hearings; ignored extensive media coverage and
139
and violated building and
lengthy litigation over possible condemnation;
zoning ordinance by adding dwelling units to an apartment building without
authorization. 40 On the other hand, defendants have prevailed where the
4
plaintiff relied on oral representations contradicted in writing1 ' and where a
was represented by counsel, failed to discover a zoning
plaintiff, 1who
42
violation.
While knowledge of pending construction projects may be publicly
available, it may not bar the orange barrel island tenant from relief.
Currently, the Illinois Department of Transportation's website makes
discovery of pending state construction projects easy for the potential
tenant. 143 However, not all road construction is done by the state. Moreover,
this information is just as easy for the landlord to obtain and relay to the
potential tenant as it is for the tenant to obtain. Since the owner is more
likely to enjoy the long-term benefits of road construction, it is more
efficient to allocate the burden of investigation to the owner where the value
of the property is linked to vehicle flow. The public availability should not
bar relief.

C. There are No More Specific Preemptory Statutes.
Application of the Act to a commercial lease is not preempted by any
The Residential Real Property
existing federal or state legislation.
applies only to residential
specifically
noted,
Disclosure Act, as previously
44
Act, unlike, for example,
Tenant
Landlord
Illinois
the
Similarly,
property.'
construed to preempt a
be
way
no
in
should
statutes,
Kansas' landlord-tenant
to
disclose facts material
failure
seller's
a
from
claim arising
consumer 1fraud
45
to a lease.
Likewise, because they serve the same ends, the Real Estate Dealer's
and Broker's License Act should not preempt a claim against a broker under
the Consumer Fraud Act. 1 46 It should be noted, however, that the Consumer
138. Cappicioni,791 N.E.2d at 558.
139. Am. Nat'l Bank, 599 N.E.2d at 35.
140. Tan, 508 N.E.2d at 59.
141. Adler v. William Blair & Co., 613 N.E.2d 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 648 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
142. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 533 N.E.2d 8 (I11.App. Ct. 1988).
143. See Illinois Dept. of Transp., Road Construction, http://www.dot.state.il.us/ (last
visited July 21, 2005) (providing information about and a map of major state road
construction projects).
144. See discussion supra note 1 (concerning the Residential Real Property Disclosure
Act).
145. Compare 765 ILL.COMP.STAT. 705/1 (2004) (negating all clauses in leases that
release landlord's from liability for physical injuries incurred on the premises) and 765
ILL.COMP.STAT. 705/5 (allowing a lessor to rescind a lease where a lessee is convicted of a
Class X felony) with KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to 58-2573 (2004) (regulating with far
greater detail the relationship and transactions between landlords and tenants).
146. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 454/15-25 (2004) (requiring brokers to treat all
customers honestly, and prohibiting them from knowingly or negligently providing false
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Fraud Act calls for a heightened degree of protection for brokers, which
unless challenged and ruled unconstitutional, requires a plaintiff to prove that
the broker, in addition to the seller, had actual knowledge of the deceptive
47
act or the omission.
D. Other JurisdictionsAllow a Claim Under a
Similarly Written Version of the Act.
Other jurisdictions have allowed relief for the commercial tenant. The
North Carolina statute bans deception "in or affecting commerce," 148 and
allows a commercial tenant to proceed against a landlord for fraudulent
inducement of the lease. 149 The Colorado statute does not explicitly refer to
omissions in the inducement of real estate contracts, 150 but has, nonetheless,
been applied to commercial leases.' 5' Texas courts would, under their
statute, likewise recognize a proper claim brought by a commercial tenant.15 2
By allowing a claim from a commercial tenant, the Illinois courts would
simply be joining those other jurisdictions that attempt to eradicate all forms
of fraud in the market.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Consumer Fraud Act
may be available to the prospective retail tenant to remedy damages caused
by a landlord's failure to disclose a known pending road construction project
that affects the value of the premises. Factors that may influence the court
are the severity of the defective material fact, the nature of the tenant's

information or failing to disclose latent material defects in the physical condition of the
property).
147. Compare 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b (requiring a plaintiff real estate buyer to
show that the defendant broker had actual knowledge of the falsity of information
provided by the seller in order to proceed against the broker under the Consumer Fraud
Act, thus exempting brokers from negligent or innocent misrepresentations) with Allen v.
Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 752, 764-65 (Ill. 2003) (declaring those portions of

the Consumer Fraud Act that provided additional safeguards for car dealerships and
salesman violated the special legislation clause in Article Four, Section Thirteen of the

Illinois Constitution).
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a).
149. See Kent v. Humphries, 275 S.E.2d 176, 182-83 (N.C. App. 1981), aff'd 281
S.E.2d 43, 46 (N.C. 1981) (reversing dismissal of plaintiffs claims where the plaintiff
tenant had acted in reliance upon the landlord's oral promise, which the landlord later

broke, to not operate a fiberglass and plastic manufacturing business ina location adjacent
to the tenant's beauty salon).
150. COLO. REv. STAT. §6-1-105(l)(a).

151. Walter v. Hall, 940 P.2d 991, 998-99 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (applying the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act against a developer who misinformed a purchaser about access

by easement across a third party's property).
152. See Koch v. Griffith-Straud Constr. & Leasing Co., No. 14-03-00526-CV, 2004
Tex. App. LEXIS 2549, at *11-13 (Tex. App. March 23, 2004) (holding a commercial

tenant satisfies the requirements of a "consumer" under the Texas Deceptive Trade

Practices Act, but ultimately denying relief to the plaintiff where the lease, which provided
the basis for the consumer's claim, did not, in fact, cause the alleged harm, i.e.,
confiscation and subsequent sale of the plaintiff's property from within the subject
premises).
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business, the parties' level of sophistication, the method of deception
employed, and the availability of knowledge to both parties.
Nevertheless, commercial property buyers and sellers deserve more
than the ambiguous gap-filling role of the Consumer Fraud Act and the
uncertainty of the common law remedies. They deserve the same level of
clear statutory disclosure guidance from the General Assembly as their
residential counterparts in Illinois and their commercial counterparts in other
states.
III.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD LEGISLATE CLEAR DISCLOSURE
STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.

The preceding sections highlight the inconsistency and unpredictability
of results where there has been an alleged failure to disclose material defects
in a commercial property transaction. This inconsistency destabilizes the
commercial real estate transaction at a time when real estate investments are
increasing at record rates. Furthermore, many of the same factors that
pushed the General Assembly to protect the residential property transactions
are now present in the commercial property transaction.
A.

Legislation is Needed

In 1993, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Residential Real
53
long after the court's recognition of the need for
Property Disclosure Act,
15 4
Enacted after much scholarly
relief to residential property buyers.
155
this Act marked the death of caveat emptor and the birth of
criticism,
156
Passed with the
buyer protection in residential real estate transactions.

153. See supranote 1.
154. See Peterson v. Hubschman, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1157-58 (Ill. 1979) (holding there is
an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes to "avoid the unjust results of
caveat emptor"); Carter, 457 N.E.2d at 1341-42 (recognizing the need for Consumer
Fraud Act protection in residential leases); Kelley v. Astor Investors, Inc., 478 N.E.2d
1346, 1349-50 (Ill. 1985) (holding there exists an implied warranty of habitability in
agreements to substantially refurbish apartment buildings to convert them into
condominiums); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d at 217 (reading an implied
warranty into apartment leases).
155. See Scheid, supra note 8 at 163 (stating, "caveat emptor does not have a ghost of a
chance of remaining a viable tenet of late twentieth century jurisprudence"); Nicola W.
Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During PrecontractualNegotiations, 24
SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 109-12 (1993) (comparing the courts' interest in good faith and
fair dealing with the Catholic Church's mandates prior to the middle ages); William D.
Grand, Implied and Statutory Warranty in the Sale of Real Estate: The Demise of Caveat
Emptor, 15 REAL EST. L. J. 44 (1986) (calling for legislatures to directly confront caveat
emptor in the sale of real estate by requiring the seller to deliver a fair product for a fair
price).
156. See Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 8 at 177-83 (describing the Granger Laws (which
protected farmers from unfair railroad rates), the Uniform Commercial Code and it's
warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Consumer Fraud Act, and the Residential Real Property Disclosure
Act as examples of legislation that was enacted specifically to combat the negative effects
of caveat emptor).
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57
support of the National Association of Realtors,
this Act also protects
5
'
litigation.
unnecessary
from
brokers
and
sellers
Many of the facts that drove the passage of the Residential Property
Disclosure Act apply to the retail tenant and other commercial property
buyers. The commercial tenant is the last leaf on the real estate branch of the
withered tree of caveat emptor1 59 Illinois courts have long recognized the
harsh realities of nondisclosure in commercial property transactions and have
strained to develop and extend doctrines to combat them. 60 Additionally,
the Uniform Consumer Sales Practice Act suggests more precise statutory
guidelines for real estate. 16 1 Though some scholars would leave the buyer in
62
the dark, others agree with the notions of fair and full disclosure.
The need for legislative protection is especially important for the
smaller commercial tenant. The physical location of a business is one of the

157. See James D. Lawlor, Mandatory Seller Disclosure Laws, PROB. & PROP., JulyAug. 1992 at 34 (explaining that the National Association of Realtors (NAR) has
dedicated much time to the construction and enactment of uniform disclosure statutes);
Scheid, supra note 8, at 155-56 (noting the NAR's influence in legislation in at least
eleven states including Illinois).
158. Scheid, supra note 8, at 185.
159. See Peterson, 389 N.E.2d at 1169 (requiring an implied warranty of habitability in
the sale of homes); Carter, 457 N.E.2d at 1341-42 (affirming relief for tenant in a
residential apartment); People ex rel. Fahner v. Tesla, 445 N.E.2d 1249, 1252-53 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (holding that a mobile-home landlord is subject to the Conusmer Fraud
Act); Perkins v. Collette, 534 N.E.2d 1312, 1317-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that
misrepresentation in the sale of vacant land is actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act);
Tan, 508 N.E.2d at 393 (granting relief to buyer of commercial property).
160. For example, Tan involved the sale, not rental, of apartment buildings, not units.
508 N.E.2d at 392. The court affirmed a judgment against the seller under the Consumer
Fraud Act. Id. at 397. The court specifically addressed the standing of the plaintiff, Dr.
Tan, in terms of the merchandise purchased, i.e., real estate. Id. The court also addressed
Dr. Tan as a consumer in terms of the defendant's occupation as a developer. Id. The
court did not, however, address the issue of Dr. Tan's standing under the Act as a buyer of
a product (66 apartment units, some of which did not conform to building codes) to be
used for resale (through leases to present and future tenants) in the ordinary course of his
new business as a landlord. See also supra Part I (outlining how courts have used strained
versions of constructive eviction, implied warranty of habitability, negligence and
common law fraud in order to provide relief where justice clearly dictated).
161. See UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 2, 7A U.L.A. 233,235 Official
Comment to Section 2(1) (1985) (excluding real estate transactions from the definition of
"consumer transaction" (and thus excluding applicability) based "[o]n the assumption that
land transactions frequently are, and should be, regulated by specialized legislation ... )
(emphasis added).
162. Compare Scheid, supra note 8, at 174-75 (noting the business world's acceptance
of disclosure requirements in commercial transactions) and Seller's Duty to Disclose,
supra note 8, at 260-61 (calling for continued legislation towards disclosure in commercial
property transactions) with Weinberger, supra note 8, at 421-23 (concluding that the
discretionary nature of the commercial transaction justifies the continuation of caveat
emptor for commercial property and that disclosure laws tend to reinvigorate the doctrine
of caveat emptor).
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single most important decisions an organization of any size faces. 163 Like
the homeowner, the small business owner will be investing a significant
portion of its budget in the property transaction. Further, just as the
homebuyer does not have the expertise to inspect a home for quality or latent
defects, the retail business owner is generally not an expert in the business of
commercial real estate.
Professor Weinberger argues that disclosure legislation increases the
demand on an already overly-clogged legal system and retards the property
market because of increased uncertainty in the transaction. 164 To the
contrary, disclosure legislation should reduce conflicts after the agreement
because both parties will have actual knowledge, prior to the agreement, of
all material facts relating to the value of the property. This knowledge places
both parties in near equal bargaining positions, allowing the forces of the
free market to determine the true value of the transaction. Thus, clear
statutory requirements should not increase litigation, but rather, should
reduce litigation lower than its current levels.
Furthermore, because clear legislation encourages a true market value,
the commercial property market should expand because investors can more
confidently rely on the quality of the premises and the finality of the
transaction. The only negative impact of disclosure is the probable reduced
value of property with defects.
B.

What Should the LegislationInclude?

Illinois should enact legislation that squarely addresses the issues that
confront the commercial property transaction, reducing the need for further
revisions. Since commercial property value is partially idiosyncratic, any
legislation should begin with broad language requiring disclosure of any fact
or circumstances not specifically enumerated that clearly affects the value of
the transaction.165 For more specific facts, the General Assembly should
look to the Illinois residential property requirements, Illinois case history,
other jurisdictions' commercial property requirements, and the parties to the
transaction to fashion a response.
The Illinois Residential Real Property Disclosure Act enumerates many
specific items to be acknowledged by both buyer and seller for any property

163. QuickMBA.com, The Marketing Mix, http://www.quickmba.com/marketing/mix/
(last visited July 31, 2005). The "Four P's"-product, price, promotion, and place -are
the four essential elements of successfully marketing a business. Id.
164. Weinberger, supra note 8, at 415-18.
165. See Cleveland C., & C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 90 Ill. App. 551, 551-52 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1900) (holding a railroad breached a lease with a tenant hotel and restaurant by
failing to stop its passenger trains at the location which affected the value of the
leasehold); Luciani v. Bestor, 436 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (dismissing a claim
arising from an alleged misrepresentation concerning the effect of Greyhound buses no
longer stopping nearby made during the sale of a motel because the plaintiffs had
knowledge of the planned discontinuance of bus service and the defendants had also
allowed the plaintiffs access to relevant financial statements and reports).
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with between one and four residential units. 166 Those requirements include
physical characteristics of the property, such as structural defects' 67 and
defects in the utilities. 168 More requirements are aimed at environmental
concerns such as the presence of radon gas, mold, or underground storage
tanks. 169 Still other requirements cover legal disputes. 170 In sum, the Illinois
Residential Act is aimed at those facts or circumstances that negatively affect
the property's value in the free market or are likely to cause litigation.
Some specific commercial disclosure requirements should pass
legislation with little debate considering the obvious effect on the value of
the property and the history of litigation in Illinois arising from their
nondisclosure. It would be difficult, for example, to argue against disclosure
of physical defects in the structure or utilities. 17' Environmental hazards are
likewise subject to litigation. 172 Of course, if the buyer is to be a party to a
lawsuit or the property is subject to other government action, such as for
improper zoning for a stated use or condemnation proceedings,
nondisclosure will almost certainly result in litigation. 73 These factors help
determine the true value of the property and should be included in disclosure
legislation.
However, commercial transactions should likewise require disclosure
of facts that affect value but are unique to the property's commercial status.
In a shopping mall lease, for example, tenants should be continually apprised
of the landlord's intent to lease to other tenants who are business
competitors. 174 Any planned changes in the highways, roads, parking space

166. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35 (requiring the seller to confirm or deny in writing
any defects in the subject property, and likewise requiring the buyer to acknowledge
receipt of same by initialing).
167. See id. (listing defects in the foundation, roof, walls or floors, and the presence of
termites or other wood-boring insects as required disclosures).
168. See id. (listing defects in the plumbing, electric, well, septic, heating and air
conditioning, ventilation, and fireplace systems to be initialed by both the buyer and the
seller).
169. Id.
170. Id. (requiring disputes over boundary lines, or violations of local, state, or federal
law to be disclosed).
171. See discussion supra Parts I & II (listing cases where disputes arose over a failure
to disclose a latent physical defect or a defect in the utilities).
172. See Tomcho, supra note 8, at 1594-95 (noting that federal law currently holds
property sellers liable for existing environmental problems on their land under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9607 (1994), unless the defect is readily observable).
173. See Christopher,52 N.E.2d 313 and Am. Nat'l Bank, 599 N.E.2d 1126 (allowing

claims by property buyers where the seller failed to disclose condemnation proceedings).
174. See Arrington v. Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp., 333 N.E.2d 50, 58 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975) (holding the dominant tenant of a commercial building did not violate its lease by
refusing to allow the landlord to lease space in the building to a prospective tenant that
was a competitor of the dominant tenant); Bolchazy v. Chicago Inv. Group, 440 N.E.2d
950, 953-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (denying relief to a tenant where the landlord negotiated a
lease with a competitor in the printing business to occupy space in the same shopping
center); Kusiciel v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 435 N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(denying relief to a tenant where the landlord misrepresented occupancy by other tenants
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175
availability, or avenues of access to the property are also material.
to a commercial property lessee is the
Another issue likely to be of concern
76
landlord's possible bankruptcy.1
Most importantly, the General Assembly should pass language that
provides the courts with clear direction on the issues of reliance, proximate
cause, materiality, and availability of public information. The ambiguous
and often conflicting decisions over these issues are a continuing cause of
litigation. Clear language on these issues is important to stop any court from
interpreting the wasteful and inefficient doctrine of caveat emptor back into
the law.
Other jurisdictions specifically address the need for regulation in the
commercial context either through commercial property legislation or
inclusion in their deceptive practices act. Tennessee, for example, expressly
protects commercial lessees under some circumstances. 77 California
requires commercial property sellers to disclose environmental safety
concerns. 178 Texas protects buyers through their deceptive trade practice act,
but limits exposure to sellers by limiting claims to buyers with assets less
than twenty-five
million dollars and looks at the relative bargaining position
79

of the parties.

Though the roots of the tree of caveat emptor may be buried in
antiquity, its leaves are falling fast. The General Assembly should not only
hasten its death, it should bum the tree at its roots. The enactment of a clear
commercial property disclosure requirement would serve that purpose for the

in the shopping center, reasoning that other lease transactions were likely to occur in the

future and beyond the knowledge of the landlord).
175. See discussion supra Part II (analyzing whether a road construction project that
interrupts the flow of traffic around a retail space is a material fact that must be disclosed
to potential consumers under the Consumer Fraud Act); Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v.
Executive Plaza, Inc., 425 N.E.2d 503, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding in favor of a
tenant where the number of parking spaces and their position in relation to the tenant's
property were decreased by the landlord's subsequent rental of premises to another
tenant); McMullen, 435 N.W.2d at 430-31 (denying relief for property buyer where
highway access to the property was eliminated).
176. See Robert M. Zinman, Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire
and the Sad History of Section 365 (H) of the Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
97, 141-42 (2004) (noting that upon the landlord's declaration of bankruptcy, the tenant in
possession of a commercial lease may not have the option to retain the lease if the lease's

value is below market value as determined by the bankruptcy trustee).
177. See TENN. CODE ANN. §66-7-108 (2004) (requiring, upon request by a prospective
tenant of less than 1500 sq. ft. of non-industrial space, a disclosure of fire, electric, and

plumbing in compliance with zoning requirements).
178. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26154 (Deering 2004) (requiring disclosure
of the presence of any mold that has not been properly removed according to applicable
standards, but not requiring an investigation into same); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.9
(Deering 2004) (requiring delivery of manual for safety during earthquakes to all
purchasers of real property, including purchasers of commercial property).
179. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (excluding from the definition of
"consumer"under Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, any
business consumer that either owns assets in excess of $25 million or is owned or
controlled by an organization with more than $25 million in assets).
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real estate industry. Further, it would reduce the potential for litigation,
serving a benefit to the legal system.

IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, this comment has shown that the struggle between caveat
emptor and good faith and fair dealing has created conflict within the
common law of constructive eviction, implied warranty of habitability, and
common law fraud. While there appears to be no Illinois case where a
commercial tenant has used the Consumer Fraud Act to obtain relief, under
some circumstances, the Act should be available as a gap-filler to provide
relief for the tenant. The Illinois General Assembly should address this
continued conflict and uncertainty in order to facilitate growth in the
commercial property market through an increased confidence in the true
value of the property and the finality of the sale.

